Touro Law Review
Volume 12

Number 2

Article 28

1996

Rule 803(4): Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or
Treatment

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
(1996) "Rule 803(4): Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment," Touro Law Review: Vol.
12: No. 2, Article 28.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss2/28

This Symposium: The Supreme Court and Local Government Law is brought to you for free and open access by
Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

et al.: FRE and NY Evidence Comparison

RULE 803(4): STATEMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF
MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR TREAIMENT
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness:
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment
and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms,
pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the
cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent
to diagnosis or treatment. 1
The 803(4) hearsay exception rests on the general reliability of
statements made to a physician or others for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment. 2 The presumption of the hearsay
exception is that the declarant will be truthful in describing
symptoms to his doctor in order to assure proper diagnosis and
method of treatment. 3 The belief is a patient is motivated to be
wholly honest with his or her doctor or other for purposes of
1. FED. R. EVID. 803(4). See also JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN ON EVIDENCE 803, at 150-72 (Joseph M. McLaughlin
ed., 1995); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 277, at 488-90 (John William Strong
ed., 4th ed. 1992).
2. United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1001 (1981). The rationale of the rule "focuses upon the patient and
relies upon the patient's strong motive to tell the truth because diagnosis or
treatment will depend in part upon what the patient says." Id. at 83-84. See
also Roberts v. Hollocher, 664 F.2d 200, 204-05 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that
statements made by the plaintiff to his physician concerning "excessive force"
were inadmissible under Rule 803(4) because these statements concerned a
conclusion going to fault rather than to "past or present conditions" or "the
cause of the condition").
3. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 83-84. "It is thought that the declarant's motive
guarantees trustworthiness sufficiently to allow an exception to the hearsay
rule." It is on this presumption that the doctor's testimony is admissible under
Rule 803(4). Id. at 84. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 442, at 456 (2d. ed. 1994). "The patient

knows that his description helps determine treatment, so he has reason to speak
candidly and carefully, and risks of insincerity and ambiguity are minimal."
Id.
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medical diagnosis. This honesty is sufficient to allow the doctor's
or other person's testimony to be an exception to the hearsay
4
rule.
In interpreting Rule 803(4), the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Iron Shell 5 emphasized
that for hearsay evidence to be admissible, the statements made
by the declarant to his physician must be pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment. 6 The Iron Shell court devised a two-prong test to
determine whether the statements were made for the purpose of
medical diagnosis or treatment. 7 The first prong requires that the
patient's motive in making his statement must be consistent with
the purpose of promoting treatment. 8 The second prong questions
whether the physician has a reasonable basis to believe that the
patient's statements of symptoms can be used in diagnosis or
treatment. 9
The Iron Shell court applied this two-prong test, and allowed
testimony into evidence of a physician relating statements made
to him by a nine-year-old victim of sexual assault. 10 The victim
stated that she was pulled into the bushes, that all of her clothes
were removed and that the attacker "tried to force something into
her vagina which hurt." 11 The court noted that all of the victim's
statements were admissible because "they were related to her
physical condition and were consistent with a motive to promote
12
treatment."

4.
5.
6.
457-65.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84.
633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981).
Id. at 83-84. See MUfLLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 3, § 442, at
Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84.
Id.
Id.
Id.

11. Id. at 82.
12. Id. at 84 (finding that the victim's statements were made for the
purpose of obtaining treatment and the doctor's questions focused on what
happened rather than who did the act). See United States v. Longie, 984 F.2d
955 (8th Cir. 1993). When applying the Iron Shell test, the Longie court found
that the statement of a child patient to a doctor identifying his abuser was
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The Advisory Committee's note for 803(4) states that a
physician or other person may recount a patient's description of
the cause of the injury if it is for the purpose of diagnosis and
treatment, but generally the exception does not extend to
statements of fault.13 Further, the Committee illustrated this
point by stating that a patient's statement, that he was struck by a
car, would be admitted under 803(4),14 but the patient's
statement that the car was driven through a red light would not
fall under 803(4).15 In addition, it is not necessary for the
16
statement to be made to a doctor for the exception to apply.
The statement can be made to any person who would use the
information to treat the person or who would pass on the
information to a doctor or other medical personnel, such as an
ambulance driver, hospital staff or family member, in order for
the 803(4) hearsay exception to take effect. 17
In Cook v. Hoppin, 18 the court explained that "Rule 803(4)
does not exclude from the hearsay rule statements relating to fault
which are not relevant to diagnosis or treatment." 19 In Cook, the
owner of an apartment house was sued for negligence regarding
the construction and maintenance of an exterior stairway after the
plaintiff fell off of the steps and sustained serious injury. 20 One
of the main issues on appeal was whether the trial court erred in
allowing into evidence a hospital record which referred to a
shoving or wrestling match as the cause of the injury. 2 1 The
court of appeals held that, in order to determine if the statements
are admissible hearsay, they must be "of the type reasonably
admissible because such information impacted the physician's course of
treatment and recommendation for counseling. Id. at 959.
13. FED. R. EviD. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.

17. Id. See MCCOMICK, supra note 1, § 277, at 489.
18.
19.
1981)).
20.
21.

783 F.2d 684 (7th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 690 (citing Roberts v. Hollocher, 664 F.2d 200, 204 (8th Cir.
Id. at 687.
Id.
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pertinent to a physician in providing treatment." 22 Based on this
23
reasoning, the Cook court deemed the records inadmissible.
The Advisory Committee's note states that a physician's
testimony of statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis
or treatment is permitted, even if the information was gleaned
from the declarant for the sole purpose of the doctor's expert
testimony at trial. 2 4 Prior to the adoption of Rule 803(4), it was
believed that if treatment was not the ultimate goal, then there
were no guarantees as to the truthfulness of the statement. 2 5 Rule
803(4), however, rejects the differentiation between testimony of
treating and nontreating physicians on the basis that jurors simply
do not distinguish between factual evidence admitted for truth
versus such evidence offered as the ground for an expert's
opinion. 2 6 Today, the correct test for determining whether expert
testimony made in reliance on a statement made for the purpose
of diagnosis is admissible under 803(4) is whether "an expert in
this particular field would be justified in relying upon [this
27
statement] in rendering an opinion."
This rule was applied in Gong v. Hirsch,2 8 where the
administrator of the decedent's estate alleged that decedent's
doctor had negligently prescribed the drug prednisone, and such
prescription caused the decedent's death. 2 9 The plaintiff tried to
admit into evidence a letter from the family doctor sent to the
decedent's employer which stated that the prednisone had caused
a perforated ulcer. 3 0 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district

court's ruling that the letter was inadmissible under 803(4).31
22. Id. at 690 (quoting United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 83 (8th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 iU.S. 1001 (1981)).
23. Id.
24. FED. R. EvID. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
25. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 1, 803, at 153-54. See, e.g.,
Padgett v. Southern Ry., 396 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1968); Chicago N.W. Ry. v.
Garwood, 167 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1948).
26. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 1, 803, at 153-54.
27. See id. at 154.
28. 913 F.2d 1269 (7th Cir. 1990).
29. Id. at 1271.
30. Id. at 1271-72.
31. Id. at 1274.
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The court noted that the letter did not "reveal symptoms,
objective data, surrounding circumstances or any similar factual
data that a reasonable physician would consider relevant in the
treatment or even diagnosis of a medical condition." 32 Instead,
the letter, though written by the doctor, was deemed to be merely
the patient's own conclusion as to his physical problem and its
cause. 33
In comparison, the Second Circuit permitted a doctor to testify,
even though the doctor's testimony was comprised of the
plaintiff's version of opinions given to her by other doctors that
treated her, as well as recollections of the plaintiff herself. 34 The
doctor clearly stated that he based his testimony, in part, on the
other doctors' reports that were in his possession and the hospital
report regarding the plaintiff's surgery, as well as the plaintiff's
statements. 35 The court held that witness's should be allowed to
explain the basis for their opinions and allowed the admission of
the evidence. 36 The holding was based on the fact that 803(4)
rejected the distinction between evidence admitted for its truth
and evidence admitted to establish the ground for a witness's
37 It is
opinion "as being too esoteric for a jury to recognize."
vital to note, however, that the court's decision hinged on the fact
that the doctor did actually have copies of the doctors' reports in
his possession, which he consulted, when the plaintiff made her
32. Id.

33. Id. The court explained that the source of the statement in the doctor's
letter was never identified. However, for 803(4) purposes, the court assumed
that the decedent or "someone acting on his behalf. . . made the statement."
Id. at 1274 n.5.
34. O'Gee v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 570 F.2d 1084, 1088 (1978). A
stewardess sued an airline caterer alleging that the incorrect placement of a
500-800 pound buffet caused her to injure her back when she tried to push the
buffet back into its proper position. Id. at 1085. District Judge Weinstein
permitted the doctor to testify not only as to what the plaintiff told him about
"her condition and its genesis, but also to what O'Gee had told him that the
other doctors had told her about the injuries." Id. at 1088-89.
35. Id. at 1089.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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statements of what those doctors said for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment. 38 Indeed, the court left open the question
of whether the doctor's testimony of the plaintiff's version of the
medical reports would have been admissible if the actual reports
39
had been unavailable.
New York common law takes an approach similar to Rule
803(4) concerning statements made by patients to medical
practitioners. New York will allow testimony by a witness as to
statements made by a person for diagnostic or treatment
purposes. 40 New York, however, does not allow out-of-court
41
statements made solely to obtain a medical expert's testimony.
"It is a well-settled principle .. that a non-treating physician,
hired only to testify as an expert witness, may not state the
history of an accident as related to him by the plaintiff or testify
42
as to plaintiffs medical complaints.,,
In Daliendo v. Johnson,43 an example of the limits of the New
York rule concerning testimony by nontreating physicians, the
plaintiff was involved in a car accident with defendant's taxi. 44
Plaintiff alleged that injuries sustained from this accident caused
him to black out while driving and caused a second car accident
three days later. 45 In addition, plaintiff submitted an affidavit of
a nontreating physician who had examined the plaintiff and
suggested a nexus between the injuries from the first accident and
the second accident. 4 6 The court found that the defendants
overstated the New York rule concerning the admissibility of

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Daliendo v. Johnson, 147 A.D.2d 312, 320, 543 N.Y.S.2d 987, 992
(2d Dep't 1989).
41. Nissen v. Rubin, 121 A.D.2d 320, 321, 504 N.Y.S.2d 106, 107 (1st
Dep't 1986) (citing Davidson v. Cornell, 132 N.Y. 228, 30 N.E. 573 (1892);
Lessin v. Direct Delivery Serv., 10 A.D.2d 624, 196 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1st Dep't
1960)).
42. Id.
43. 147 A.D.2d 312, 543 N.Y.S.2d 987 (2d Dep't 1989).
44. Daliendo, 147 A.D.2d at 314-15, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 988-89.
45. Id. at 315, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 989.
46. Id. at 316, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 989.
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of nontreating

physicians. 47

While

the court

acknowledged that a nontreating physician's testimony should not

include statements made by a party about the history of the
accident or the party's medical complaints in order to prevent
"unfair bolstering of a party's credibility," the court held that the

rule does not prevent a medical expert from examining a
plaintiff, looking at the facts and deducing an opinion. 4 8 On this

basis, the court held the nontreating physician's testimony
admissible.
In Nissen v. Rubin,4 9 the court held that it was "highly

prejudicial" to admit expert testimony of two non-treating
physicians who testified to the plaintiffs

rendition of his

accident, including their view of plaintiff's physical ailments.5 0
This was based on the view that to admit such evidence "permits
the plaintiff to unfairly buttress his claim." 5 1 Thus, the court held

that the testimony of the nontreating physicians was inadmissible
52
because it recounted the history of the plaintiff s accident.
Furthermore, the court noted that the most significant aspect of
the error by the trial court in admitting the testimony of the
53
nontreating physicians was its damage to the defendants' case.

Finally, the Nissen court explained New York's aversion to
47. Id. at 320, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 992.
48. Id. The Daliendo court held that the defendant's motion for summary
judgment should have been denied because it was for the trier of fact to decide
whether a sufficient nexus existed between the plaintiff's injuries in the first
accident in order to infer that they were the cause of the second accident. Id.
The court stated that "a medical expert would be permitted to render an
opinion that the injured party sustained a concussion in one accident and, as a
result of that brain injury, suffered a blackout three days later" in order to
establish the relationship. Id.
49. 121 A.D.2d 320, 504 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Ist Dep't 1986).
50. Id. at 321, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 107. Plaintiff alleged that he slipped and
fell from the fourth floor of his apartment building to the third floor due to the
landlord's negligence. Id. In response, defendant introduced into evidence
plaintiff's alleged statement made to a nurse in the hospital wherein plaintiff
stated that he hit his head on a filing cabinet. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 322, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
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admitting testimony by a nontreating medical expert under the
hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment. 54 The court stated that "while a 'strong
inducement' may exist for a patient to speak truthfully of his
pains and sufferings for the purpose of treatment, 'it may be
otherwise when medically examined for the purposes of creating
evidence in his own behalf.' 55
Federal Rule 803(4) permits testimony by physicians
concerning statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment even if the statements were made solely for the purpose

of gaining the doctor's expert testimony for trial. 56 In contrast,
New York will admit hearsay statements by a physician, or other
54. Id. at 322, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 107-08.
55. Id. (citing Davidson v. Cornell, 132 N.Y. 228, 229, 30 N.E. 573, 574
(1892). When preparing for trial, it is in the plaintiff's best interest to describe
his injuries to the doctor who will be testifying on his behalf, and how the
injuries are the result of the accident. Davidson, 132 N.Y. at 237, 30 N.E. at
576. However, this testimony would be considered hearsay and, therefore,
inadmissible because the statements were made for the purpose of preparing
evidence for litigation rather than for treatment. Id. at 238, 30 N.E. at 576. A
plaintiffs credibility is questionable when he is testifying on his own behalf,
especially when it is corroborated by experts testifying about information
supplied by the plaintiff. Id.
56. FED. R. EvID. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
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person, only if they relate directly to present pain. 57 The
Davidson court held that the doctor's testimony regarding present
pain and suffering brought on by the accident was admissible
because of its inherent reliability. 58 However, statements made
relating to discomfort experienced over the last year as a result of
the incident would be inadmissible hearsay. 59 Testimony based
on statements made for the sole purpose of litigation is also
60
deemed inadmissible in New York.

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 237, 30 N.E. at 576.
Id. at 238, 30 N.E. at 576.
Id.
Id. at 237, 30 N.E. at 576.
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